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AN ERA OF FOREIGN POLITICAL INTERFERENCE:
IMPULSIVE, OVERCOMPENSATION OF AUSTRALIA, AND A
COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE SCHEMES WITH THE
UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
In an era of “fake news,” where misinformation is spread through different
types of media to intentionally deceive voters, foreign political interference and
its opaqueness have become dangerous and far-reaching threats to democracy.
In June 2018, Australia passed sweeping legislation to combat foreign
interference in politics, resulting in the most significant counterintelligence
overhaul in decades.1 In response to events like Russia’s interference in the
United States’ 2016 presidential election, the threat and fear of Chinese
interference to Australia’s democratic process, and the pressure of approaching
by-elections, Australia rushed to introduce and effectuate these new laws.2 Some
Australian national security experts praise the new legislation, deeming the
measures “overdue, and necessary for an age when Russian hackers can
undermine American democracy without going near a voting booth, and when
China’s mingling of economic and political interests is redefining geopolitics.”3
However, a nation that impulsively and hastily drafts, introduces, and passes
sweeping reform faces unintended side effects. On their face, the new laws target
foreign influence and seek to create transparency for the Australian government
and the public.4 The laws also aim to strengthen punishment against espionage,
sabotage, and secrecy offenses.5 Lurking beneath the surface of the superficial
functionality of the legislative regime are issues that cannot be concealed and
will not remain dormant. Australia’s new laws: (i) fail to achieve their goal of
1
Damien Cave & Jacqueline Williams, Australian Law Targets Foreign Interference. China Is Not
Pleased., N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/australia/australia-securitylaws-foreign-interference.html.
2
James Elton-Pym, Sweeping Changes to Espionage, Treason and Secrecy Laws as Foreign
Interference Bills Pass, SBS NEWS (June 28, 2018), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/sweeping-changes-toespionage-treason-and-secrecy-laws-as-foreign-interference-bills-pass; Clive Hamilton, Australia’s Fight
Against Chinese Political Interference, FOREIGN AFF. (July 26, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/australia/2018-07-26/australias-fight-against-chinese-political-interference; Insiders: Christian Porter
Joins Insiders (Australian Broadcasting Corporation television broadcast June 10, 2018) [hereinafter Insiders]
http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/christian-porter-joins-insiders/9855012.
3
Cave & Williams, supra note 1.
4
Attorney-General Christian Porter, Australia’s National Security Greatly Enhanced with New Laws,
ATT’Y-GEN.’S DEP’T (June 28, 2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/media/media-releases/australiasnational-security-greatly-enhanced-new-laws-28-june-2018.
5
Id.
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preventing foreign political interference; (ii) hinder Australian civil liberties;
and (iii) create additional, undesirable, and costly problems.
This Comment will analyze the failure of Australia’s new legislation
regarding national security and foreign political interference. Part I sets out the
relevant background and history of what prompted the new Australian laws
followed by a discussion of the legislation itself, including its procedural history
and structure. Part II reveals that Australia’s new laws fail to achieve their goal
of preventing foreign political interference, hinder Australian civil liberties, and
create additional, undesirable and costly problems. Part III explores the United
States’ historical context and legislative framework to protect against foreign
political interference as compared to Australia’s new laws. Finally, Part IV
proposes what Australia should have done differently, and what it should do
moving forward to correct its failed legislative reform.
I.

AUSTRALIA’S 2018 NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
REFORM PACKAGE

A. What Prompted the New Australian Laws?
Often times, paranoia and fear lead to impulsivity and hastiness. This was
the case in Australia’s national security and foreign interference reform.6 The
climate of international relations between Australia and China, in combination
with overdramatized media and the viral spreading of “fake news,” led Australia
to become weak and fearful, resulting in the implementation of poorly drafted
laws and disregard for potential consequences.7
All eyes around the globe, including Australia, rested on the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. With two very flawed candidates up for election to serve
as the next President of the United States, controversy filled the air just as the
oxygen we breathe. Amidst all the controversy and distractions, the U.S.
democratic process became the target and victim of foreign political
interference.8 Russia successfully attacked and influenced the outcome of the

6
Evelyn Douek, What’s in Australia’s New Laws on Foreign Interference in Domestic Politics,
LAWFARE (July 11, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-australias-new-laws-foreign-interferencedomestic-politics.
7
Hamilton, supra note 2; Insiders, supra note 2.
8
Ellen Nakashima & Shane Harris, How the Russians Hacked the DNC and Passed its Emails to
WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (July 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-therussians-hacked-the-dnc-and-passed-its-emails-to-wikileaks/2018/07/13/af19a828-86c3-11e8-8553a3ce89036c78_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c4d1b8fc6986.
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U.S. political process.9 The most concrete examples include, the hacking and
public release of the Democratic National Committee emails to WikiLeaks and
the illegal obtaining of information of over 500,000 voters in the state of
Illinois.10 Australian Attorney-General Christian Porter’s reference to Russia’s
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election confirms the role it played in
the creation of Australia’s new laws, “[t]here were Twitter bots and Russian troll
farms paying for advertising on Facebook in the context of the American
election. So these types of events, occurrences, behaviours that we are seeing
arise in the context of democratic elections all around the Western world are not
something we are immune from.”11
Fear of China’s ability to influence Australia’s political process also played
a major role in Australia’s decision to reform its national security and foreign
interference laws.12 In 2017, as a result of the discussion surrounding Russia’s
influence in the recent U.S. presidential election, Australia became increasingly
concerned with threat of foreign political interference in its own political
process, and began investigating whether China had interfered with Australia’s
political processes.13 Australia, as a major force in the Pacific, is an attractive
target for China and because in Australia, contrary to other developed countries,
foreign donations are legal, which can be very difficult to track in a highly
unregulated campaign finance system.14 In June of 2017, Australian intelligence
“identified two prominent businessmen of Chinese descent” who donated
millions to Australia over recent years as potential agents of the Chinese
government, resulting in significant political influence.15 According to a study
conducted by the Melbourne Law School’s Dollars and Democracy Database,
approximately eighty percent of foreign political donations to Australian parties
between 2000 and 2016 were received from China.16
Finally, pressure to pass the new legislation before the upcoming 2018 byelections played a major role in creating a sense of urgency to pass reform.17
Australian Attorney-General Christian Porter addressed Australia’s stance on
the need to have such laws take effect as soon as possible:
9

Id.
Id.
11
Insiders, supra note 2.
12
Hamilton, supra note 2.
13
Cave & Williams, supra note 1.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Joshua Kurlantzick, Australia, New Zealand Face China’s Influence, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec.
13, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-new-zealand-face-chinas-influence.
17
Insiders, supra note 2.
10
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We have heard from the Director-General of [Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation] ASIO that the efforts by foreign countries
and foreign agencies to effect changes of Australian opinion in a covert
way, to influence democratic outcomes, are on the rise so it makes
complete sense to have these laws in place before the next large
democratic event. And I might just add that these laws, for the first
time ever, will make it an offence to covertly interfere with Australian
democratic processes so, of course, it’s very important to have those
laws in place before the next big set of democratic process.18

Fear caused by past foreign interference between other countries, fear of future
foreign interference to its own democratic process, and the reality of fastapproaching by-elections prompted Australia to hastily pass a new national
security and foreign political interference regime.19
B. Procedural History, Structure, and Substance of the New Australian Laws
The National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign
Interference) Bill 2017 was introduced on December 7, 2017.20 Additionally, on
the same day, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2017 was
introduced.21 On June 28, 2018, the Australian government passed a legislation
reform package consisting of the National Security Legislation Amendment
(Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2018 (NSLA) and the Foreign
Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2018 (FITS) targeting foreign interference
and foreign influence.22 These Acts received royal assent on June 29, 2018.23
1. The National Security Legislation Amendment
According to the Revised Explanatory Memorandum of the National
Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill
2018, the NSLA aims to serve specific purposes.24 Such purposes which, are

18
19
20

Id.
Elton-Pym, supra note 2; Hamilton, supra note 2; Insiders, supra note 2.
National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017 (Cth)

(Austl.).
21

Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2017 (Cth) (Austl.).
Kelly Buchanan, Australia: Bills Containing New Espionage, Foreign Interference Offenses, and
Establishing Foreign Agent Registry Enacted, LIBR. CONG. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/australia-bills-containing-new-espionage-foreign-interference-offenses-and-establishing-foreignagent-registry-enacted/.
23
Id.
24
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and
Foreign Interference) Bill 2017 (Cth) 2 (Austl.) (this 2017 Revised Explanatory Memorandum was prepared
prior to the actual 2018 bill).
22
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relevant to the scope of this Comment, include: (1) enacting new foreign
interference violations targeted towards “covert, deceptive or threatening
actions” by foreign parties attempting to influence or harm Australian
government and democratic processes; (2) modernizing laws, such as treason, to
protect government defense and democracy; (3) strengthening current espionage
laws, including protecting against foreign economic espionage by enacting new
laws regarding theft of trade secrets; (4) reforming secrecy laws to adequately
prevent damaging information leaks while preserving freedom of speech; (5)
reshaping laws against sabotage to safeguard infrastructure amidst modern
tampering capabilities; (6) introducing new laws to punish giving false or
misleading information in order to gain security clearance; and (7) providing law
enforcement with sufficient access to telecommunications interception
capabilities to investigate violations of any such laws.25
The NSLA made numerous amendments to Chapter 5 of Australia’s
Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code).26 Division 92 was inserted into
Part 5.2 of the Criminal Code and contains Australia’s new foreign interference
offenses.27 These new foreign interference offenses criminalize harmful conduct
of foreign principals intending to interfere with Australia’s political,
governmental, or democratic processes; to support their own intelligence
activities; or to otherwise compromise Australia’s national security.28 For
purposes of this Comment, some of the relevant changes and additions
effectuated by the NSLA to the Criminal Code are listed below:
(a) Division 92.2(1) creates:
an offence to engage in conduct that is covert or involves
deception, threats or menaces on behalf of a foreign
principal with an intention to: influence a political or
governmental process of the Commonwealth or a State or
Territory, influence the exercise of an Australian
democratic or political right, support intelligence activities
of a foreign principal, or prejudice Australia’s national
security;29

(b) Division 92.2(2) creates:
an offence to engage in conduct on behalf of a foreign
25

Id.
Australia Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.); Buchanan, supra note 22.
27
Buchanan, supra note 22.
28
Id.
29
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and
Foreign Interference) Bill 2018 (Cth) 191 (Austl.).
26
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principal with an intention to influence another person (the
target) in relation to a political or governmental process or
the exercise of an Australian democratic or political right
without disclosing to the target that they are working for a
foreign principal;30

(c) Division 92.4 creates “an offence of preparing for a foreign
interference offence. The offence will criminalise conduct in
preparation for, or planning an offence of foreign interference;”31
(d) Division 92.7 is an offense for knowingly supporting a foreign
intelligence agency. It creates “an offence to provide resources or
material support to an organisation or person acting on behalf of an
organisation where the person knows that the organisation” is one of
foreign intelligence;32
(e) Division 92.9 creates an offense for “knowingly funding or being
funded by [a] foreign intelligence agency;”33
(f) Division 92A.1 creates “an offence to dishonestly receive, obtain,
take, copy or duplicate, sell, buy or disclose information that is a trade
secret on behalf of a foreign government principal;”34 and
(g) Division 83.4 “creates an offence that applies where a person uses
force, violence, threats or intimidation to interfere with a person’s
democratic or political right under the Constitution or
Commonwealth law.”35
2. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme
FITS aims to facilitate transparency for the Australian public and
government regarding foreign influence on Australia’s political and
governmental processes by utilizing a registration scheme.36 While the
registration scheme does not prohibit foreign actors from being involved in
Australia’s political and governmental processes, it creates obligations for
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Austl. Gov’t, Espionage, Foreign Interference and Foreign Influence, ATT’Y-GEN.’S DEP’T,
https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/EspionageForeignInterferenceandForeignInfluence/Pages/default.asp
x (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Espionage].
31
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persons or entities who have arrangements with, or perform activities or other
functions on behalf of, foreign principals. The registration scheme reveals when
a person is acting on behalf of a foreign actor.37 Disclosure of such information
permits both the Australian government and the public to accurately and
sufficiently assess such foreign influence on domestic interests.38
FITS will accomplish several goals and serve certain purposes relevant to
the scope of this Comment.39 These include: (1) mandatory registration by any
persons performing certain activities on behalf of a foreign principal; (2)
possible exemptions for certain types of activities or persons; (3) ability of the
Secretary to issue a transparency notice; mandatory disclosures (initial and
ongoing) by registrants regarding the nature of their relations with the foreign
principal and any such actions taken pursuant to that relationship; and (4)
additional disclosure requirements during “times of democratic significance,”
such as elections and voting periods; and the availability of certain information
to the public in order to promote transparency and public trust of the
government.40
According to the simplified outline of FITS, persons may become subject to
registration under the scheme if they (a) “undertake[] registrable activities on
behalf of a foreign principal (even if the person only does so once); or (b) if the
person enters [into] an arrangement with a foreign principal to undertake
registrable activities on behalf of the foreign principal (whether or not the person
actually undertakes the activities).”41 Registrable activities include:
(a) parliamentary lobbying within Australia on behalf of a foreign
government;
(b) activities within Australia for the purposes of influencing a
political or governmental system or process (parliamentary
lobbying on behalf of a foreign principal that is not a foreign
government; general political lobbying; communications activity;
and donor activity);
(c) a former Cabinet Minister that acts on behalf of a foreign principal
within 3 years of being Cabinet Minister;
(d) a former Minister of MP that acts on behalf of a foreign principal
within 3 years of being Minister of MP; and

37

Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2018 (Cth) 2

(Austl.).
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id.
Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2018 (Cth) 23–24 (Austl.).
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(e) a former senior Commonwealth public official that acts on behalf
of a foreign principal within eighteen months following their
public role.42

There are certain exemptions in place that allow a person to opt-out of
registration for activities that commonly involve arrangements with foreign
principals.43 These include activities done for the sole purpose of providing
humanitarian aid, legal advice, or representation, religious pursuits, reporting or
presenting news as privately-owned media, certain business or commercial
activities, and diplomatic activities of officials while performing their official
duties and functions.44
A seemingly convincing justification for this registration scheme is fear that
foreign influence will compromise Australia’s sovereignty and interests. This
registration scheme seeks to deny the accrual of undesirable benefits for foreign
countries at Australia’s expense. Part II of this Comment will address how the
new laws, including the registration scheme, fail to protect against foreign
interference and actually create more problems than they solve.
II. EFFECTS OF THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION: FLAWS OF THE LAWS
A. Failure of the New Laws to Achieve Its Goals
The new legislation was allegedly drafted and effectuated with the purpose
of preventing foreign political interference.45 Australia is one of the first
countries to reform its national security laws in an effort to end foreign political
interference.46 Other democratic countries like the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany are waiting to see how Australia’s new legislation plays
out.47 However, this new legislation is an example of “reckless lawmaking for
purely electoral gain.”48

42
Austl. Gov’t, Overview of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, ATT’Y-GEN.’S DEP’T,
https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/EspionageForeignInterferenceandForeignInfluence/Documents/Overv
iew-Foreign-Influence-Transparency-Scheme.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Overview].
43
Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2018 (Cth) 23–24 (Austl.).
44
Overview, supra note 42.
45
Elton-Pym, supra note 2.
46
Jason Scott, China Put on Notice by Australia’s Anti-Interference Laws, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-27/china-put-on-notice-by-australia-s-anti-interferencelaws (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
47
Sunita Bose, People Power and Privacy Are Casualties of Australia’s Foreign Interference Laws,
ACCESS NOW (July 3, 2018), https://www.accessnow.org/people-power-and-privacy-are-casualties-ofaustralias-foreign-interference-laws/.
48
Noel Pearson, Turnbull’s Foreign Interference Laws Bad for Australian Liberties, AUSTRALIAN
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The new Australian legislation is the result of “unprincipled politics” that
formulate superficial solutions.49 Reflexively assuming that laws are the solution
to every problem, as Australia has done with its national security and foreign
interference reform, often results in the birth of new problems stemming from
impulsive and uninformed regulations.50 Because using fear can be an effective
way of garnering public support, Australia’s government has used national
security threats to create fear and garner electoral support for passage of its new
laws.51 This strategy has become popular in American politics in recent years.
For example, U.S. President Donald Trump rose to power through a strategy
largely reliant upon utilizing fear to rally support.52 Trump continues to use this
strategy when advocating for new laws and acquiring funds for various
projects.53 It seems that Australia has recognized this strategy’s effectiveness in
accumulating public support and has adopted similar tactics to pass new
legislation, despite any questionable ethical concerns.
Australia’s laws were designed to prevent foreign political interference and
promote Australia’s democratic process.54 However, the laws actually cause
damage to many of the civil and democratic freedoms that they are designed to
protect.55 Thus, the reform has clearly failed to carry out its purpose.
B. Negatively Impact Australian Civil Liberties
“Civil liberties are a common casualty of national security measures, but
rarely are they as blatantly oppressive as the Turnbull government’s [recent]
espionage laws.”56 Australia’s attempt to stop foreign political interference
through legislation is so broad and overreaching that it violates the civil liberties
of everyday Australian citizens by restricting their ability to advocate for better
policies and laws.57 Today, although foreign political interference is a legitimate
threat to Australia and attempts should be made to fight against it, it is equally,
(July 28, 2018), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/turnbulls-foreign-interference-laws-bad-foraustralian-liberties/news-story/efb27f68a54391c57441586f5aa3e026.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Alex Altman, No President Has Spread Fear Like Donald Trump, TIME (Feb. 9, 2017), http://time.com/
4665755/donald-trump-fear/.
53
Id.
54
Elton-Pym, supra note 2.
55
See discussion infra Section II.B.
56
Claire O’Rourke et al., Trusting the Government to Protect Civil Liberties? That’s a Sick Joke,
GUARDIAN (June 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/13/trusting-the-government-toprotect-civil-liberties-thats-a-sick-joke.
57
Bose, supra note 47.
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if not more, important to protect and continue to facilitate Australians’
democratic freedoms.58
In a largely globalized world, many important changes to both domestic and
international law come from countries connecting with one another both in
support and opposition of important legal and social issues. Australia’s new laws
criminalize cooperative international political activities between foreign
countries and organizations, which constitutes “an assault on fundamental and
democratic legal rights” of Australian citizens.59
Under the newly implemented Division 92, it may now be a crime—
punishable by a maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment—to
collaborate with international groups or individuals for purposes of seeking
political change for any issue, such as environmental, refugee, geo-strategic, and
anti-war issues.60 One of the most notable problems with laws established
pursuant to the NSLA and FITS is poorly drafted language. Impulsively drafted
and rushed legislation has left important terms either undefined or too broadly
defined. Such broadly drafted laws resemble those of authoritarian governments,
which attempt to oppress human rights defenders and government critics, rather
than protect the freedom to advocate for new laws and policies.61
Sweeping language in Division 92 sets out the primary offense of intentional
foreign interference; it criminalizes conduct “‘on behalf of, or in collaboration
with, a foreign principal,’ that is intended to: (1) ‘influence a political or
governmental process;’ (2) ‘influence the exercise’ of an ‘Australian democratic
or political right or duty;’ (3) ‘support intelligence activities of a foreign
principal;’ or (4) ‘prejudice Australia’s national security.’”62 The biggest issue
with the new language is that the term national security has been expanded to
include “the country’s political, military, or economic relations with another
country or other countries.”63
The term collaboration is left undefined but could mean “consultation,
information-sharing, coordination, or even online communication.”64 Therefore,
58
Elaine Pearson, Australia’s Government Must Guard Against Foreign Interference, but Not by Curbing
Our Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 13, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/14/australias-governmentmust-guard-against-foreign-interference-not-curbing-our-rights [hereinafter Government Must Guard Against].
59
Mike Head, Australia’s New “Foreign Interference” Laws: A Threat to Anti-War Dissent, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (July 12, 2018), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/07/12/inte-j12.html.
60
Id.
61
Pearson, supra note 58.
62
Head, supra note 59.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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it is possible that an Australian citizen campaigning against the government’s
involvement in another country’s military action would be charged criminally if
contact was established with an international organization.65
Additionally, foreign principal is defined to include “foreign political
organisations and foreign political parties,” leading to the potential
imprisonment of Australians who are simply members of an international
political organization.66 The language “[i]nfluence the exercise of a democratic
or political right or duty” could potentially include participation by Australians
in global boycotts and other movements, or participation in the organization of
counter-protests in foreign matters.67
Under Division 92, Australians who “recklessly communicate information
about Australia’s political and economic relations with another country” could
be sentenced to a significant amount of time in prison.68 This damages
Australians’ freedom of speech, creating a chilling effect, because citizens will
become too scared of incarceration to speak up and express their views or expose
pertinent information.69 In reality, while Australia has created these new laws to
prevent foreign interference, especially from China, it has become more like
China itself; Australia now limits reasonable and necessary access to
information that is within the public interest.70
International organizations, including the United Nations, are included in the
definition of foreign principal under the new laws.71 Consequently, the reporting
of human rights violations by the Australian government, such as war crimes or
violations of refugees’ rights, may now be a crime.72 The overly broad definition
of national security may allow the government to charge and imprison for
espionage Australians who reveal politically sensitive information.73 While
keeping certain information classified is essential to the public interest and for
national security, this should not include information that is merely disturbing
or embarrassing for the government and that poses no security threat.74 Without

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bose, supra note 47.
Id.
Pearson, supra note 58.
Head, supra note 59.
Id.
Pearson, supra note 58.
Id.
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exception, no citizen should ever be criminally punished for exposing human
rights violations as a result of government actions.75
C. Chilling Effect: “The Perfect Storm”
Just as temperature, air pressure, humidity, and winds may fuse together in
unique combinations to form a natural disaster; the combination of new,
unfamiliar, and broadly drafted laws—along with a population’s fear of being
criminalized—can concoct a detrimental chilling effect on transnational
activism.76
Ironically, while the new laws aim to protect democracy from foreign
influence, individuals collaborating with democratic activists in a foreign
country to organize rallies in Australia may actually be prosecuted for illegal
foreign interference.77 Some of the most powerful human rights movements and
significant cultural change has come about through use of technology, digital
communications, and people from different countries around the globe who band
together and advocate for policy issues.78 An example is the powerful #MeToo
movement. This movement has empowered women and unified them, through
the courage of other women around the globe, to stand and fight against sexual
abuse.79 The Internet age similarly allows people from different countries to
instantly connect and cooperate to fight against domestic and foreign
injustices.80 People should be allowed, and even encouraged, to partake in such
international collaboration. Rarely does any form of isolationism facilitate
positive change in our increasingly globalized world.81 Collaboration between
different countries and people of diverse cultures ultimately creates a more
functional, integrated, and fair global society. However, the new Australian laws
will likely deter Australians from participating in global advocacy as they may
be subject to imprisonment for working together with foreign entities on social
and political issues.82
In a democratic society, where individuals may be more progressive or
conservative, ideas shape, develop, and drive evolution in the pursuit of
75

Id.
See Cave & Williams, supra note 1.
77
Id.
78
Bose, supra note 47.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See Dominique Moisi, The Problems with Isolation, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 2, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/01/the-problems-with-isolation/.
82
See id.
76
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Utopia.83 Ideas, responsible for innovation and progress, rely on openness.84
“You can’t be open to new ideas yet be afraid of influence, domestic or
international.”85 Influence among nations is inevitable in a free world, and it
would be impossible for the globalization of human rights and other freedoms
to progress without porous borders and transnational influence.86 The most
effective way to combat improper foreign interference is through “the tried and
true mechanisms of democracy: exposure, questioning, debate and criticism.”87
Under the new laws, if a human-rights activist has a conversation with a
foreign government or foreign officials who share a passion for the same cause,
and takes notes or keeps any other records of that conversation, it could be
illegal.88 This means it would be dangerous for an Australian human-rights
activist to communicate with American or United Nations officials.89
Ultimately, “[c]asual conversation could become criminal if [a human-rights
activist] dares to take notes about what was discussed, and if the government
deems the information vital to its broadened definition of national interests.”90
While the government argues that safeguards are in place such as requiring
“‘[a] part’ of the conduct [to be] ‘covert’ or ‘deceptive,’” the language allows
for such broad construal that too many activities may be criminalized.91 “For
example, conduct may be covert if a person takes steps to conceal their
communications with [a] foreign principal, such as deliberately moving onto
encrypted communication platforms.”92 Thus, under the new laws, using an
encrypted phone or Internet connection, which is a common practice in today’s
highly technological and hacker-susceptible society, to communicate with a
“foreign principal,” may be grounds for conviction and imprisonment.93 The
result is that implementing a standard means of protection over one’s privacy
has the potential to become a serious criminal offense.94

83

See Pearson, supra note 48.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Cave & Williams, supra note 1.
89
Damien Cave, How Australia’s Espionage Laws Could Silence Whistle-Blowers and Activists, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/australia/australia-espionage-law.
html.
90
Id.
91
Head, supra note 59.
92
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and
Foreign Interference) Bill 2017 (Austl.) at 205.
93
Head, supra note 59.
94
Id.
84

MACKCOMMENTPROOFS_2.3.20

380

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

2/10/2020 10:12 AM

[Vol. 34

Another recent provision under the NSLA, which allows for a potential
sentence of up to ten years of incarceration, criminalizes “preparing” to commit
a foreign interference offense, even if such conduct does not actually occur.95
Under this new offense, “preparation” extends criminal liability to merely
discussing an idea for a possible act of foreign interference.96 This development
significantly broadens the scope of “unperformed” acts that the Australian
Criminal Code criminalizes, such as attempting, aiding, or conspiring to commit
foreign interference.97
Additionally, under the NSLA, a person, either intentionally or recklessly,
can neither provide “material support,” nor receive funds from a foreign
intelligence agency. 98 This is yet another blow to the public that contributes to
the fear of arbitrary criminalization. For example, the reckless standard could
apply to someone who was unknowingly used, or tricked, by an intelligence
agent to provide support or receive funds.99
Furthermore, the Australian government presumes to deny bail to any
individual charged with a new crime established by the NSLA.100 In the event
an individual with dual citizenship is convicted of any such crime, the home
affairs minister may revoke their Australian citizenship.101 The Australian
government argues a safeguard exists to the revocation of Australian citizenship:
the attorney-general is required to personally authorize these types of
prosecutions.102 However, this protection is deceitful and ineffective because “a
person [may still be] arrested, charged, detained, and denied bail while [awaiting
the attorney-general’s] decision.”103 Thus, a person may still suffer from the
harmful effects of these new laws even if they are not actually prosecuted for
committing an offense.104 As a result, can ordinary Australian citizens who
choose not to exercise their so-called “protected” civil rights to advocate for
change for the common good really be faulted?
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D. Other Costly and Problematic Effects of the New Laws
1. Tension with China
Australia has become “the first developed country to pass sweeping laws
against foreign interference, in a move aimed at reducing Chinese meddling in
national affairs and [is] seen as the inspiration for legislation introduced in the
U.S. Congress.”105 Although the Australian government has denied that the new
laws are aimed specifically towards China, the promulgation of these laws and
Australia’s well-established fear of Chinese political and economic influence
make the connection undeniable.106 China has taken offense to the new
legislation, and tension has increased between Australia and Beijing.107
Australia has ratified a spinoff form of democratic government, which the
author of this Comment calls: “the Hypocrisy Democracy.” Keep in mind the
purpose of the new laws—to prevent foreign political interference—while
considering the following interference by none other than the United States of
America. Prior to the passage of Australia’s new legislation, the United States
made a heavy political and military push in support of the passage of Australia’s
new laws, specifically over concerns of interference by China.108 Prevalent U.S.
figures, including ex-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and
former presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and John McCain, visited
Australia promoting the need for passage of the new laws.109 Furthermore, the
United States welcomed Australian advocates to testify before Congress,
painting a picture of Australia standing at the frontlines of the war against
Chinese “influence,” and the Australian government was happy to accommodate
the U.S. invitation to testify.110
This seems like the exact “foreign political interference” that Australia is
legislating against. Under the new laws, the Australian delegates sent to testify
before the U.S. Congress to promote passage of the new laws would receive
harsh criminal punishment in the form of extensive imprisonment. However, it
is clear that Australia will not prosecute the U.S. agents’ overt and covert
“interference.”111 This is evidence that Australia only intended to legislate
against, and more importantly, only intended to prosecute against, foreign
105
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107
108
109
110
111
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interference when it inconveniences or goes against the government’s interests.
2. Too Much Executive Power Creates Potential for Abuse
Under the new laws, the Attorney-General ultimately has the power and
discretion to prosecute.112 This provides little comfort. Imagine in the United
States, a police officer tells an individual—who is a member of a minority
group—“under the law, it is illegal to smoke marijuana, but I give you
permission to smoke marijuana, and I will not arrest you for it.” Considering the
police officer still has the power to arrest, how much faith will the minority
individual have that he can now smoke marijuana without being arrested? Now
consider that an Australian journalist, who is actually trying to benefit the public
interest, is told by the government, “[it may be illegal under the new laws for
you to report certain information in the public interest, but] the attorney general
has veto power over prosecutions and will choose not to prosecute journalists
and community groups.”113 Will the journalist rely on this statement, even
though the law says otherwise? This creates fear in the reporting of such
information, and rightfully so. “Asking Australians to trust this government to
safeguard the civil liberties of its critics, when it is doing everything it can to
silence them, is a sick joke. Speaking for future governments is even more
treacherous.”114
The extremely broad definition of “national security” gives the AttorneyGeneral room to argue that such reporting of information or campaigning against
certain policies harms trust, confidence, and economic and political relations
with foreign countries.115 This creates a compelling incentive for the government
to use its discretion “to pursue politically motivated prosecutions,” rather than
to protect against imminent national security of foreign interference.116 Not only
will these laws enable the government to take advantage of its access to
information via intelligence entities and discredit ordinary Australian citizens by
claiming they may be involved in a form of foreign political interference, but it
also creates circumstances that can allow the government to misuse such access
to information to discredit their political opponents, either directly or by
association.117
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Another issue is whether Australia is undermining diplomacy by targeting
covert activity that security officials claim exist but do not fully disclose
justifications to the public.118 In a sense, Australian citizens must simply accept
the Australian government’s unverified claims regarding the necessity of these
new laws as truth.119
3. Damage to International Business Relations
As a result of the new laws, Australia’s economy will incur incalculable
expenses on transacting international business, particularly with China.120 The
methods and mechanisms required to carry out and enforce the new laws will be
detrimentally expensive, and the likelihood of harm to Australia’s reputation as
a result of the new ill-conceived reform will deter and constrain enterprise.121
“These laws will create illegal activity where before them the activity would
have been perfectly legal business intercourse in a global economy.”122
4. Damage to Australia’s Image and Reputation in the Global Community
Another effect the new laws will have is reviving an “anti-Chinese
suspicion,” or racism.123 The laws will make it close to impossible for a ChineseAustralian to hold political office without being suspected of acting as a
“Manchurian candidate.”124 The rest of the world will look upon Australia as
being a paranoid, xenophobic, and quite plainly, a weak nation.125 This is
comparable to the climate created in the United States regarding Muslims, or
any individual of Middle-Eastern descent.126 Recent laws such as the travel ban,
or “Muslim Ban,” implemented by the Trump Administration out of fear have
led the United States to be viewed as racist, paranoid, and weak.127 It is likely
the same will hold true in regards to Australia’s new legislation and its effect on
people of Chinese descent.
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III. UNITED STATES’ FOREIGN POLITICAL INTERFERENCE LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH
Foreign political interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election played
an integral role in influencing Australia to reform its national security and
foreign political interference laws.128 The United States is long regarded as the
golden standard for a sound democratic government. Thus, it is imperative to
analyze and compare the U.S. legislative framework regarding foreign political
interference to gain a better understanding of how it has shaped and influenced
Australia’s new laws.
A. Historical Precedence of Foreign Political Interference in the United
States
A brief comparison of two instances occurring at different times in U.S.
history brings to light how foreign political interference evolves with technology
and how developed countries, like the United States and Australia, may deal
with such atrocities. Foreign political interference in the United States dates back
to the very first contested presidential election of 1796, between Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams.129
A French agent, Pierre-Auguste Adet, released private information to the
American public to sway voters to elect Jefferson.130 Adet hoped that Jefferson
would be elected and turn the United States against Great Britain, which would
be seen as a win for France.131 Adet simultaneously released a series of signed
letters to the U.S. Secretary of State, and to a large Philadelphia newspaper for
publishing.132 The letters asserted that France would declare war against the
United States if Jefferson was not elected as president, which struck fear among
American voters.133
In the 2016 presidential election, Russia hacked emails from the Democratic
National Convention and released this private information to the American
public with the intent to diminish trust in Hilary Clinton and garner support for
Donald Trump.134 In this recent act of foreign political interference, the rapid
128
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spread of information to a wider audience via the Internet, television, and social
media amplified the damage.135 The two instances of interference are
distinguishable because the act of foreign interference in the 2016 presidential
election was covert.136 Leading up to the election, it was unclear who released
the harmful information, yet news channels and websites still distributed the
leaks.137 It was not until after Donald Trump was elected that the leak was traced
to Russia.138
In the aftermath of the 1796 presidential election, U.S. leaders issued
political prescriptions in response to foreign political interference, rather than
enacting new legislation.139 Creating public awareness and attributing such
interference to France was an effective technique to combat future foreign
political interference for many years.140 After the 2016 presidential election, it
became necessary for the United State to utilize existing legislation and to
effectuate new laws to deter further foreign interference in the future. This was
a more conservative approach than Australia’s complete overhaul of national
security legislation. The following is not an exhaustive collection of U.S. law on
foreign political interference, but rather an overview of some of the significant
laws and regulations which combat such interference—some of which have
come into effect quite recently.
B. Foreign Agents Registration Act 1938
1. What is FARA?
Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) to:
insure that the U.S. Government and the people of the United States
are informed of the source of information (propaganda) and the
identity of persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy,
and laws.141

Prior to WWII, to combat the prevalent numbers of German propaganda agents
in the United States, Congress enacted FARA.142 FARA:
135
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requires every agent of a foreign principal, not otherwise exempt,
to register with the Department of Justice and file forms outlining
its agreements with, income from, and expenditures on behalf of
the foreign principal. These forms are public records and must be
supplemented every six months. [FARA] also requires that
informational materials … be labeled with a conspicuous statement
that the information is disseminated by the agents on behalf of the
foreign principal. The agent must provide copies of such materials
to the Attorney General.143
2. Australia’s Registration Scheme versus FARA
The Australian registration scheme established by the Foreign Interference
Transparency Scheme, is largely based on FARA, but differs in numerous
ways.144 On the whole, Australia’s scheme is narrower than FARA, but it is
broader in some ways.145 For example, FARA more broadly defines the term,
“foreign principal,” to include any non-U.S. person, while Australia’s scheme
defines the same term only to include foreign governments, political
organizations, and related entities and individuals.146 However, after recent
review of a U.S. Justice Department report FARA enforcement issues were
revealed due to high evidentiary hurdles and a lack of power and resources to
produce records.147 As a result, Australia’s government decided to draft its
scheme more broadly.148 For example, Australia’s registration scheme does not
include registration exemptions for persons already registered as lobbyists.149 It
also includes provisions that give more power to the Australian government to
compel the submission of records and information.150
3. FARA Related Statutes
There are a number of related statutes that interact with FARA by setting out
exceptions or additional requirements for the registration of agents.151 FARA
does not require agents of foreign principals who engage in lobbying activities,
other than agents of foreign governments or political parties, to register if they
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have already registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA).152 It
is a crime for a public official of the United States, in any branch of government,
to act as an agent of a foreign principal required to register under FARA.153
Unless, that public official registers under FARA and receives permission from
the head of the U.S. employing agency that they are employed by.154 Any person
who has knowledge or has received instruction or assignment in espionage or
sabotage tactics of a foreign country or foreign political party must register with
the Attorney-General.155
C. Executive Order 13848 and the DETER Act
On September 12, 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 13848
(E.O.), which serves as a deterrent of foreign political interference by imposing
discretionary sanctions to keep foreign nations from interfering with the
American democratic process.156 The E.O. defines “foreign interference”
broadly to include a wide array of acts such as cyber-hacking, tampering with
voter registration lists and voting systems, manipulating vote counts, and
spreading disinformation in an attempt to undermine the U.S. democratic and
electoral processes.157 The E.O. grants power to the Treasury Department
allowing it to suspend the assets of any foreign actor that either directly
interfered with an election—like illegally accessing election and campaign
infrastructure—or provided material support to or acted as an agent for those
directly involved in an act of foreign political interference—like covert,
widespread distribution of false information via social or traditional media
channels.158
The E.O. is a tool that prevents further foreign political interference. This
provides the United States with a level of short-term protection to buy some time
to carefully draft and pass any additional legislation that may be necessary.
However, the E.O. is not free of flaws.
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Separate from the E.O., a new pending piece of legislation, the Defending
Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2018 (DETER Act), has
gathered bipartisan support in the United States.159 Under this act, mandatory
sanctions would be imposed against Russia if the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence concludes that Russia has interfered with a United States election.160
Sanctions would affect Russian financial institutions, energy companies,
defense and intelligence sectors, Russian-owned entities, debt-transactions, and
certain Russian political figures and oligarchs.161 The key distinction between
the E.O. and the DETER Act is the implementation of harsh, mandatory
sanctions.162 Under the E.O., the President has vast discretion as to whether to
impose certain sanctions on Russia.163 This is problematic because during a time
when the American people are politically-split, and when so many lack
confidence and trust in President Trump’s intentions due to the ongoing
investigation of the Trump administration’s potential collusion with Russia,
discretionary punishment toward Russia for interfering with U.S. elections is not
enough.
It is worth raising questions about the effectiveness of the DETER Act in
attaining its goals. As with the enactment of any legislation, there may be
unintended side effects. For example, blocking financial transactions with
Russia in multiple sectors may actually hurt U.S. companies as much as or more
than Russian entities.164 Russia may even welcome such treatment in certain
industries, such as energy.165 For example, if transactions with Russian energy
companies are blocked, some of which are joint ventures that have received
massive American funding, U.S. companies may be forced to withdraw as
partners.166 This would result in a major financial blow to the U.S. economy and
workforce, and Russian companies would benefit by taking over these energy
firms upon American exit and exploiting all of the financial gains for
themselves.167 Thus, while narrowly tailored sanctions can be an effective
deterrent to foreign political interference, if the sanctions are overly broad they
159
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can potentially reward the meddling state that they are intended to punish.
D. Other United States Statutes and Acts Relevant to Foreign Political
Interference
1. Honest Ads Act
As a result of outdated laws that did not evolve with new technologies,
Russia influenced the 2016 presidential election by spreading propaganda and
false information through purchased advertisements on social media platforms
and search engines such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google.168 U.S. leaders
introduced a bill to Congress in direct response to Russian interference in the
2016 presidential election called the Honest Ads Act (HAA).169 The bill’s
purpose is to prevent foreign interference in future elections and improve the
transparency of online political advertisements.170 The HAA attempts to
introduce new laws aimed at limiting foreign interference that would require
political advertisements sold online to fall under the same laws as
advertisements sold on television and radio stations.171
2. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
In 2017, the Trump administration enacted new laws targeting Russia,
among other countries, within the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA).172 The section of CAATSA aimed at Russia, known
as the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017
(CRIEEA), imposes numerous mandatory sanctions against Russia and requires
congressional review if the President opts to lift or waive such sanctions.173 An
example of such mandatory sanctions CRIEEA imposes are “Cyber Sanctions,”
which are blocking sanctions (property blocked by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control) on any person who knowingly engages in significant activities that
undermine cybersecurity against a democratic government on behalf of the
Russian government.174 Additionally, CRIEEA requires evaluations,
168
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assessments, and reports analyzing effects of exposure to Russian-related risks
on the U.S. economy.175 For example, CRIEEA mandates a report on the
exposure of key U.S. economic sectors to Russian politically exposed persons
and entities, which include the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate
sectors, along with the probable economic outcomes of placing capital funding
restrictions and other sanctions on Russian parastatal entities.176 In the aftermath
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election—doubts may exist as to President Trump’s
personal interests and relations with Russia—CAATSA and CRIEEA serve as
checks on Trump’s ability to provide favorable treatment to Russia at U.S.
expense.
3. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 1986, with
its main purpose is to grant the U.S. government authority to prosecute anyone
that “knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access.”177 However, as the law currently stands, it is unclear if the
CFAA extends to the hacking of voting machines, like the Russian tampering
that took place in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.178 The CFAA prohibits
hacking computers that are connected to the Internet, but electronic voting
machines are generally offline and not subject to CFAA regulation.179 There has
been a recent push to introduce legislation that would include voting machines
under CFAA, but as of now the issue remains unresolved.180
E. Recent United States Focus on Election Infrastructure and Security
Not only has the United States taken steps to protect against foreign political
interference through legislation, but individual states have also taken steps to
protect election security through improvements to infrastructure and
implementing procedures to reduce successful voting machine hacking or
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malfunction.181 Since the 2016 presidential election, all fifty U.S. states have
implemented variations of new standards, procedures, or practices to protect
against foreign hacking or interference in voting processes.182 These include, but
are not limited to, setting minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration
systems, using voter-verified paper ballots, conducting post-election audits that
test election results, performing ballot accounting and reconciliation, returning
voted paper absentee ballots, requiring voting machine certification
requirements, and conducting pre-election logic and accuracy testing.183 These
types of solutions will likely serve as effective short-term or quick-fix solutions
to foreign political interference in democratic elections.
III. TO LEGISLATE, OR NOT TO LEGISLATE … THAT IS THE QUESTION
Though often it is, law is not the answer to everything. It is important for a
nation to consider the consequences of reacting too quickly, out of fear, when
attempting to reform a complex and sensitive field of law, especially with
regards to national security. After examining U.S. law on political interference,
it is clear that some things work and other things do not, illustrating that there
are inevitably pros and cons to all laws. Hastily drafted, sweeping reform is not
the answer to Australia’s fear of foreign political interference, especially when
weighing-in the damage dealt to its citizens’ civil liberties.
The proposed purpose for Australia’s new laws is to protect against foreign
political interference. Therefore, it is important to understand why foreign
political interference can be detrimental to a democracy. A democracy is “a
government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised
by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually
involving periodically held free elections.”184 States that aim to interfere with
another’s democratic processes have one goal: to affect elections in ways that
benefit themselves. Thus, the number one goal when trying to protect against
foreign political interference should be to protect against interference with
elections. It is important for a democratic government to put faith in its citizens
and to believe that they can sift through what is real and what is fake or altered
by other countries and make important political decisions for itself. The
181
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government’s job, simply put, is to put faith in its citizens, do everything it can
to secure elections;,and to the extent possible limit the spreading of damaging,
misinformation by foreign actors. This is why a complete overhaul of Australia’s
national security regime was not necessary and did more harm than good
because it was done so reactively and impulsively.
A. Improving Election Infrastructure to Alleviate Short-Term Concerns
Australia’s new laws do not protect against or solve any problems regarding
foreign states hacking elections. Instead of reactively passing this sweeping new
scheme, Australia could have worked to make its election infrastructure more
secure and resistant to hacking and privacy breaches, rather than reform its
national security as a whole. Part of a democratic process is allowing access to
information, promoting the ability to advocate for change, and voluntarily
working with others—even foreign states—who share different beliefs. So long
as procedures exist to reasonably limit the distribution of misinformation,
governments should allow their citizens to believe what they want, be exposed
to different ideas, and exercise their democratic right to vote. The most important
thing is ensuring that the public can trust that the actual voting process is secure
and uncompromised.
When garnering support for passage of its new laws, the Australian
government seemed to be leaning on the concerns of the public about the shortterm effects of foreign political interference in its upcoming elections.185
Australia should have first focused on quick practices to secure its election
infrastructure and procedures, which would have bought it some time to consider
the need for new laws.
While Australia may have been hesitant to follow the lead of the United
States since the United States fell victim to foreign political interference,
Australia should have looked to how the United States reacted and combatted
against future interference. Australia could have benefitted by looking to state
practice within the United States, following the 2016 presidential election,
regarding methods individual states adopted to strengthen voting infrastructure.
Implementing just a few baseline standards and protocols—for example, using
voter-verified paper ballots, conducting post-election audits to assess accuracy
of election results, or requiring voting machine certification requirements and
minimum cybersecurity standards—could have abolished many of the
immediate concerns of foreign political interference in Australia’s upcoming
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elections.186
If and once government officials concluded sweeping reform of national
security laws was necessary, such strengthened infrastructure would have been
just the effective, quick-fix solution that would yield the requisite time needed
to draft more targeted national security and foreign political interference
legislation. As a result, its language would be more precise and less broad and
encompassing than it stands in its current form. It is equally important to protect
the rights of citizens as it is to protect against foreign political interference, so
such laws should be well-reasoned and painstakingly drafted. Patching up
vulnerabilities in election infrastructure will likely only remain effective
protections against foreign interference until foreign meddlers find a way around
these solutions. Improvements to voting infrastructure merely buy time for a
nation to put into place effective long-term solutions to foreign political
interference.
B. Treaty: A Long-Term Solution
Australia’s passing of such broad reform that is obviously and blatantly
directed towards China has inevitably caused tension and strain in relations
between the two countries.187 A powerful and resentful enemy is a dangerous
enemy. Thus, Australia is probably more vulnerable to political interference
from China than ever before, even with the passage of recent legislation.
There is no changing the past, but moving forward, Australia should attempt
to mend relations with China by proposing a treaty. However, this will not be an
easy feat. China will likely be very hesitant, and even hostile at first, if Australia
introduces talks of a treaty. That is why Australia should utilize a “carrot and
stick” approach.188 Australia should threaten sanctions as sticks and offer
attractive incentives to China as carrots.
Successfully proposing and enacting a treaty with China achieves a few
goals: (1) it places a strong deterrent on China to refrain from any form of
political interference through use of costly sanctions; (2) it provides a record of
clear and written laws as security for Australia against foreign political
interference; (3) it creates business and social incentives for China to refrain
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from acts of interference; and (4) it begins the road to repairing relations between
Australia and China, which in turn will reduce China’s desire to interfere with
Australia’s democratic process.
1. Deterrence Through Imposing Sanctions
Sanctions may prove to be an effective means of deterring foreign political
interference. Imposing sanctions against China unilaterally, and prior to enacting
its new legislative regime, may have been an effective short-term tool for
preventing interference in Australia’s fast-approaching elections. Such an
approach could have bought Australia some time to properly draft new laws and
protect its elections in the meantime. However, now that Australia has already
reformed its laws, unilateral sanctions are no longer a smart option to further
protect against interference from China, as this would only be adding fuel to the
fire.
As the current situation stands, Australia should impose sanctions on China
by treaty, rather than unilaterally. It is logical to think imposing any kind of
sanctions will only anger China and further damage international relations.
However, if Australia chooses to utilize a sanctions strategy, the benefits of
doing so by treaty, rather than unilaterally, outweighs the potential
consequences. By proposing and negotiating a treaty, China will have some say
in the outcome, which may help to alleviate any ill-will or hostility that may
otherwise result from Australia imposing sanctions without giving China a
voice. Whichever type of sanctions strategy Australia chooses to employ, it
should base the substantive provisions off of the U.S. DETER Act and
CAATSA. However, the penalties should be more narrowly targeted to ensure
that Australia’s own economy is not detrimentally affected.
2. Tangible Record of Clear, Written Laws as Security
Perhaps one of the most underestimated and overlooked features of enacting
laws by treaty, is that a treaty creates a tangible record of what the law is. In the
event a state party violates foreign political interference provisions in a treaty,
Australia can literally point to the law, bring a claim in court, and seek
reparations. Specifying prohibited acts of foreign political interference by
treaty—a process that is inherently governed by international law and agreed
upon by consenting parties—would effectively eliminate China’s ability to
claim that Australia’s unilaterally-passed domestic laws are biased, unjust, or do
not apply to them.
Simply put, codifying illegal acts of foreign political interference by treaty
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would make it much harder for China to reasonably commit such violations. Not
only are treaties recognized as law in international courts, but also China could
face backlash from other states upon interfering with Australia’s democratic
process. Such backlash could take the form of a damaged reputation and a
reduction in the willingness of other states to enter into agreements with China.
3. Incentives to Abstain from Foreign Political Interference
Not only can a treaty serve to deter a state from certain conduct, but also its
contractual nature and elements can allow for incentives. To maximize a treaty’s
underlying strategy and intent, Australia should consider including provisions
that give China incentives to refrain from foreign political interference, rather
than rely solely on punishment and penalties.
Statistics from the 2018 Global Wealth Migration Review show that in 2017,
“Australia was the world’s [number one] migration destination for millionaires
… More than 10,000 high-worth individuals migrated to Australia last year,
mostly from China, India and the UK.”189 Furthermore, an estimated 90% of the
visas issued in Australia to these wealthy investors were for Chinese nationals.190
On par with these facts is the proposition that “[f]or China’s growing class of
ultra rich, Australia has become the go-to destination for investment, leisure and,
in many cases, establishing a second home.”191 Australian real estate has
escalated in value in recent years making this real estate a particularly promising
investment opportunity.192 Over $15 billion Australian dollars have been
invested by Chinese investors in Australian real estate in 2017, which is over
double the amount invested by any other foreign nation.193
Additionally, a high-quality education in an English-speaking state is
another major attraction for the Chinese.194 Over 170,000 Chinese students were
enrolled in Australian educational institutions in 2017, earning them the title of
the biggest contributor to Australia’s $28 billion international education
sector.195
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Australia possesses resources that are so attractive to Chinese individuals
with large net-worths, some of who may have made large political contributions
to influence Australian government. Australia should use that leverage to
negotiate terms in a treaty offering favorable treatment to China regarding
foreign investment, specifically in real estate and education. This may
accomplish a number of objectives, such as limiting foreign political
interference, improving friendly relations between Australia and China, and
continuing stimulation and growth of Australia’s economy.
4. Repair Damaged Relations Between Australia and China
When Australia passed its new reform regarding foreign political
interference, it did not take any measures to draft the reform in a way that did
not make it seem directly aimed at China. Further, it failed to consider the
resulting backlash. China is such a powerful nation with incredible influence in
the global community. If Australia feared China’s influence on its government,
the worst thing Australia could have done was stir up hostility between the two
nations. By passing its new legislation in such an accusatory manner, it gave
China even more incentive to interfere with the Australian government out of
animosity. Working with China as partners, rather than adversaries, in the
creation of a treaty is a smarter and less risky technique for reaching a symbiotic
solution.
C. Laws to Directly Regulate Misinformation Being Spread via Social Media
Finally, Australia’s new laws do not seem to directly address one of the
easiest and most effective ways that foreign states can interfere with democratic
processes: distribution of misinformation through posts and paid advertisements
on social media.196 While it is possible that some social media companies might
be required to register under FITS, Australia should have addressed this problem
directly by including explicit language similar to the Honest Ads Act which the
United States is attempting to pass.197 If the purpose of the new laws are to
prevent foreign political interference, this is too significant an issue to leave to
chance or to rely on ambiguity in the hopes that social media companies will end
up having to register under FITS.
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CONCLUSION
Foreign political interference aimed at democratic nations is undoubtedly a
growing concern in a largely globalized and modernized society. Australia’s
sweeping national security reform, aimed at preventing foreign political
interference, serves as a real-time experiment to all other democratic nations.
While certainly not perfect, the United States, a pioneer of democracy, has taken
a more well-reasoned and conservative approach to preventing against further
foreign political interference in future elections. Australia’s overhaul of its
national security laws is impulsive, counterproductive in many ways, and
ineffective as to its ultimate goal. Moving forward, to effectively begin reducing
foreign political interference and countering the unintended side effects of its
new laws, it is essential for Australia to strengthen its election infrastructure
through minimum standards and common-sense techniques and to begin
working towards better relations with China. Also, Australia should introduce
talks of treaty negotiations with China, utilizing sanctions and incentives to
reduce China’s motive for interfering with Australian democratic processes.
Impulsive and hastily drafted legislation is not the answer to concerns of foreign
political interference and national security.
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